Fair payment protocol is designed to guarantee fairness in electronic purchasing, that is, no party can falsely deny involvement in the transaction or having sent/received the specific items/payment. In this paper we first present an efficient fair payment protocol providing invisibility of TTP, timeliness, and standard RSA signatures as the final non-repudiation evidences. Then we present a second payment protocol which is the first one to provide abuse-freeness. Our protocols can be easily integrated into the existing electronic payment systems.
INTRODUCTION
Fair payment protocol is designed to guarantee fairness in electronic purchasing, that is, no party can falsely deny involvement in the transaction or having sent/received the specific items/payment. For simplicity, we assume the merchant (Alice) and the client (Bob) have settled on the item and the price. Then the fair payment protocol only needs to deal with the exchange the item with the receipt signed by Bob. The receipt includes item identity, price information, Bob's account information, etc. So with the signed receipt, Alice can get her payment from Bob's account through the bank. Besides the item, Alice also needs to send to Bob a non-repudiation evidence of origin (NRO) proving she has sent the item. The receipt Bob generates can be seen as a non-repudiation evidence of receipt (NRR). The protocol must assure that both parties either get his/her expected item/receipt/evidence or nothing. Asokan, Schunter, & Waidner (Apr. 1997 ) introduces the idea of optimistic approach and presents fair protocols with offline TTP, in which TTP intervenes only when an error occurs (network error or malicious party's cheating). Ever since then, subsequent efforts in this approach resulted in efficient and fair protocols (Asokan & Shoup (1998) , Kremer, & Markowitch (May 2000) , we call them as AK protocol) that can guarantee that both parties can terminate the protocol timely while assuring fairness (called property of timeliness). Their messages & rounds optimality and basic building blocks (main protocol, resolve and abort sub-protocols) are well analyzed and widely accepted. Invisible TTP is first introduced by Micali Micali (1997) to solve this problem. The TTP can generate exactly the same evidences as the sender or the recipient. In this way, judging the outcome evidences and received items cannot decide whether the TTP has been involved. There are two way of thinking: 1)The first one is using verifiable signature encryption (VSE). It means to send the signature's cipher encrypted with TTP's public key before sending the signature itself. And try to convince the recipient that it is the right signature and it can be recovered (decrypted) by TTP in case of errors. But as Boyd & Foo (1998) has pointed out, verifiable encryption is computationally expensive.
2) The other approach is to use convertible signatures (CS) and it is recently focused approach. It means to firstly send a partial committed signature (verifiable by the recipient) that can be converted into a full signature (that is a normal signature) by both the TTP and the signer. Works by Boyd & Foo (1998) and Markowitch & Kremer (Oct. 2001) are early efforts to use this approach to construct fair protocols.
Abuse-freeness, as a new requirement of fair protocols, is first mentioned by Boyd & Foo (1998) , and formally presented by Garay, Jakobsson & MacKenzie (1999) . And Garay et al. have also realized an abuse-free contract signing protocol.
Based on the Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo designated verifier signature (Jakobsson, Sako & Impagliazzo (1996) ), they introduce a new signature scheme called Private Contract Signature to realize this property.
Previous efforts studying the fairness issue in payment systems include Asokan, Schunter, & Waidner (Apr. 1997) and Boyd & Foo (1998) . As discussed earlier, these two protocols are not efficient and practical enough as to recent advances in area of fair exchange: 1) the former one is based on the approach of VSE, which is computationally expensive and the generated evidences are not standard signatures; 2) the latter one suffers from relatively heavy communication burden for it involves an interactive verification process (in open network, less communication rounds means less risks), and it has taken little account of the important properties of timeliness and abuse-freeness.
In this paper we first present an efficient fair payment protocol with a non-interactive verification process. Then we present a second payment protocol which is the first one to provide abuse-freeness. And our new abuse-free protocol does not need any specialized signature scheme like Garay et al. ( propose the Private Contract Signature), which achieve better simplicity and efficiency. When building our protocols, we also follow the principles proposed by Gurgens, Rudolph & Vogt (Oct. 2003) to strengthen security of protocol label and messages. The two protocols use an adaptation of the convertible signature scheme proposed by Gennaro, Krawczyk & Rabin (1997) (GKR scheme) and used by Boyd & Foo (1998) . The original scheme uses an interactive verification process that is not practical for fair protocols. So we replace it by a non-interactive verifying approach developed by ourselves. That is how we construct the first protocol of our proposals. Using the designated verifier proofs by Jakobsson, Sako & Impagliazzo (1996) (and strengthened by Wang (2003)), we achieve abuse-freeness in our second protocol. Briefly, designated verifier proof means that the proofs can convince nobody except the designated verifier (say Bob) and its underlying statement is "Eitherθ is true or I can sign as Bob". In this way, outside parties will not believeθ is true as Bob can simulate this proof himself. In section 2, we present 5 important requirements for fair payment protocol and other preliminaries for later description use. Section 3 presents the first protocol and its detailed analysis. And section 4 describes how designated verifier proofs can be fixed into the scheme to build the abuse-free protocol. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
PRELIMINARIES

Requirement on Fair Payment Protocols
Based on these former works, we present a complete set of requirement definitions for fair payment protocols. 
Definition 1 Effectiveness
Notation
We use following notation to describe the protocols. h(): a collision resistant one-way hash function 
A FAIR PAYMENT PROTOCOL WITH INVISIBLE TTP
A register sub-protocol is presented because both parties must negotiate with TTP on some common parameters like shared secret keys. The registration sub-protocol between the Alice/Bob and TTP needs to be run only once. And the resulting common parameters can be used for any number of transactions. Our protocol is based on an adapted version of the GKR signature scheme. Our adaptation makes major change based on the one by Boyd & Foo (1998) . We mainly adapt the verification process and the basic idea is just the same. For completeness of description, we still give a sketch of the basic information and the registration sub-protocol.
Let n be the Alice's RSA modulus. n is a strong prime and it satisfies n=pq where p=2p'+1 and q=2q'+1 (p,q,p',q' are primes). Her public key is the pair (e,n) and private key is d. To make the signature convertible, d is multiplicative divided in d 1 and d 2 , satisfying 1 2
. d 1 (chosen by the TTP) is the secret key shared between Alice and TTP, it will be used to convert the partial signature to a final one.
Registration Sub-protocol Alice requests for key registration by sending her public key pair (e, n) to the TTP. TTP checks the validity of n (by checking its certificate, the checking is denoted by check_pk() Following we focus our attention on our non-interactive verification process. We assume that Alice knows PS B ( ω ) and Bob knows PS A (ω ).
Generating Proofs
Alice selects a random number In our protocol, we denote the content to be signed as a=( f NRO , B, l, h(k) , cipher, E TTP (k)), then the partial evidence of origin (PEO) is PS A (a) plus pf (PS A (a)) and the final evidence, i.e. NRO, is FS A (a). Similarly, let b=( f NRR , A, l, receipt), then the partial evidence of receipt (PER) is PS B (b) plus pf (PS A (b)) and the NRR is FS B (b). After the first move, Bob needs to verify the Alice's partial signature. Bob will quit the protocol when the verification fails. When Alice gets the PER, she does the same thing. But instead of simply quitting the protocol, she needs to involve the abort sub-protocol. This is important because it will prevent Bob's later recovery that may result in unfair situation for Alice. The recovery sub-protocol is executed when an error happens, one party needs TTP's help to decrypt the key k and generate the final evidences for him/her. The recovery request is denoted by 
Main Protocol
1) A→B：f PEO , B, l, h(k), cipher, E TTP (l,k), PS A (a), pf (PS A (a)) if not ( ( ( )), , ( ), ,( ))A A A then stop verify pf PS a a PS a PS ω ω 2) B→A：f PER , A, l, PS B (b), pf (PS A (b)) if A times out then abort if not ( ( ( )), , ( ), ,( ))Rec X = S X (f RecX , Y, l). Recovery Sub-protocol 1) X→TTP: f RecX , f Sub , Y, l, h(cipher), h(k), E TTP (l,k), Rec X , PS A (a), PS B (b) if h )≠h(D TTP (E TTP (k))) or a
MODIFY THE PROTOCOL TO PROVIDE ABUSE-FREENESS
In Section 3, we have used a secure non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to achieve an efficient fair payment protocol. But this kind of protocol may result in undesirable circumstances: because the partial signature's proof is universally verifiable, a not so honest Alice can present Bob's partial signature to an outside company proving that Bob has purchased something, and in this way to affect the company's purchasing decision. Abuse-freeness, firstly defined by Garay, Jakobsson & MacKenzie (1999) . And Chadha, Mitchell, Scedrov & Shmatikov (Sep. 2003) propose a more precise definition of this property: one party couldn't prove to an outside party that the other party has participated in the protocol. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we produce two fair payment protocols providing invisibility of TTP. They use the RSA-based convertible signature scheme. To be more efficient and practical for asynchronous network, we replace the original interactive verification process with a non-interactive one. To achieve abuse-freeness in the second protocol, we use an adaptation of the designated verifiers proofs by Jakobsson et al.
We have shown that these two protocols are practical because they meet all important requirements, their evidences are standardized, and the communication burden is row in that they only needs 4 interactions in a faultless run. Our future work will be focused on the application of the fair protocols to real electronic commerce systems like SCM and CRM.
